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I. Introduction
To many observers, Jim Taricani is a hero, standing his ground to
defend the free-speech principles that have guided him through 30
years of reporting the news.
But that's not how the judge who sentenced Taricani to six
months of home detention sees things.' Instead, Chief U.S. District
Judge Ernest C. Torres of the District of Rhode Island views the 55-
year-old reporter's stance-refusing to reveal the name of the
confidential source who supplied him with an FBI videotape showing
the then-mayor of Providence accepting a bribe from an undercover
law enforcement agent-as an illegal tactic employed in an effort to
get a story at any cost.2 According to Judge Torres, the sentence is not
intended to admonish a reporter for protecting source confidentiality,
* Ms. Knox is a third year student at UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco.
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but rather to discourage journalists from breaking the law to break a
story.3 "A reporter should be chilled from violating the law in order to
get a story, and from making ill-advised promises of confidentiality,"
Torres said at Taricani's Dec. 9, 2004, sentencing hearing.
The notion of the reporter's privilege-that journalists are
somehow above the law when it comes to disclosing sources or
unpublished notes-is deeply rooted in the industry, though
newsgatherers acknowledge that the courts have not always looked
kindly upon reporters who refuse to provide such information when
subpoenaed.5 To date, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia
have enacted shield laws that provide varying degrees of protection to
reporters, their sources, and their notes.6
Now some lawmakers are asking whether similar protections are
appropriate at the federal level. In 2005, Senator Christopher Dodd
(D-Conn.), Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), and Representative
Mike Pence (R-Ind.) proposed legislation that would give individual
reporters and news organizations absolute protection against
compelled revealing of sources and qualified protection against
disclosure of news and information
Should reporters be treated differently from others when it
comes to information they possess that may be useful in criminal and
civil proceedings? Are reporters and the tasks they perform really so
special as to warrant heightened protection, especially given the
reality of terrorism and other threats in today's world? This note
examines the roots of the reporter's privilege, surveys selected state
shield laws, and considers the impact of the seminal Supreme Court
case in the federal realm.
II. Roots of the Reporter's Privilege and the Road to
Branzburg
The fight to protect sources dates back to before the American
Revolution, when, in 1734, famed New York publisher John Paul
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Charles D. Tobin, From John Peter Zenger to Paul Branzburg: The Early
Development of Journalist's Privilege, MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Issue No.
2 2004, at 29.
6. Robert D. Lystad & Malena F. Barzilai, Reporter's Privilege: Legislative and
Regulatory Developments, MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Issue No. 2 2004, at
85-86.




Zenger faced criminal charges of seditious libel.8 Zenger's misdeed
was publishing unsigned columns that were critical of Crown
Governor William Cosby.9 Zenger's attorney, Andrew Hamilton,
convinced a jury that Zenger's protection of the governor's critics was
necessary, as it could "affect every free man that lives under a British
government on the main of America.' ' 0
More than a century later, New York Herald reporter John
Nugent was jailed by the United States Senate after he refused to
reveal the source who leaked details of the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, which ended the war between the United States and Mexico
in 1848." The Senate demanded that Nugent disclose the source (later
believed to be Secretary of State James Buchanan), but the reporter
refused and was eventually released from Senate custody,
purportedly for the protection of his own health.12 In discussing
whether the Senate even had the authority to hold Nugent in
contempt for refusing to disclose a source, Judge Cranch of the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not
mention any First Amendment privilege, nor did he mention the fact
that the petitioner was a reporter. 3 Instead, he decided that Nugent's
detention was proper after reviewing various parliamentary bodies'
authority in matters of contempt. 4
It wasn't until the middle of the 20th Century that courts began
to broach the possibility that the Constitution might permit reporters
to shield their sources. 5 In 1957, New York Herald Tribune columnist
Marie Torre published information about Judy Garland that the
actress considered defamatory. 6 Garland believed that the source of
the allegedly false material was an unnamed CBS network executive
and attempted to compel Torre to disclose the source's identity. 7
Torre argued that she was constitutionally entitled to protect her
source because compelling a newspaper reporter to disclose such
sources would violate First Amendment guarantees by imposing a
8. Tobin, supra note 5, at 29-30.
9. Id. at 30.
10. Id.
11. U.S. Senate website, "The Senate Arrests a Reporter," at
http://wwwsenate.gov.artandhistory/minute/The-SenateArrestsA-Reporter.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2004).
12. Id.
13. Tobin, supra note 5, at 33-34.
14. Id. at 33; Ex Parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1848).
15. Tobin, supra note 5, at 41.
16. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958).
17. Tobin, supra note 5, at 41.
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practical restraint on the dissemination of news to the public by
erecting a barrier between the media and its sources. 8 Torre also
argued that, in addition to but separate from this constitutional
consideration, a societal interest in "assuring a free and unrestricted
flow of news to the public should impel this court to hold that the
identity of a confidential news source is protected by at least a
qualified privilege."' 9
Second Circuit Judge (and later Supreme Court Justice) Potter
Stewart rejected all of Torre's arguments, although he did recognize
that in some circumstances there may be a First Amendment privilege
for reporters in protecting their sources. ° "But freedom of the press,
precious and vital though it is to a free society, is not an absolute.
What must be determined is whether the interest to be served by
compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies
some impairment of this First Amendment Freedom."2' Stewart went
on to say that the "paramount public interest" of fair administration
of justice must give way under the Constitution to freedom of the
press.22 In other words, he maintained that there is a strong societal
interest in maintaining order and resolving disputes in courts of law,
and freedom of the press cannot stand in the way of this duty.23 As for
Torre's assertion that she was protected by qualified evidentiary
privilege, Stewart could not find any such privilege, neither from
precedent nor in state law.24 "To recognize the privilege asserted
here," he wrote, "assuming our power to do so, would poorly serve
the cause of justice."'
This view of the reporter's privilege (or non-existence thereof)
illustrates how the common law's emphasis on the need for all
possible evidence in judicial proceedings conquered the
Revolutionary tradition of the importance of the anonymous critic. 26
Over the next 15 years, until the Branzburg v. Hayes decision in the
Supreme Court, both federal and state courts relied on Garland v.
Torre in finding that journalists could not protect sources based on
18. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547-48.
19. Id. at 548.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 549.
23. Garland, 259 F.2d at 549.
24. Id. at 550.
25. Id.
26. Tobin, supra note 5, at 46.
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some notion of constitutional privilege.27 Opinions in these cases
overlooked the idea of a balancing test that Stewart alluded to, a test
that likely would benefit reporters.28 It was not until 1972 that the
Supreme Court spoke to whether there is any privilege afforded to
reporters that can be read into the First Amendment.29
I. The Branzburg Decision: Benefit or Detriment to
Freedom of the Press?
In 1969, reporter Paul Branzburg produced a story for the
Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Dispatch detailing his observations of two
individuals in their efforts to synthesize hashish from marijuana." The
hash makers, who boasted they could earn more than $5,000 in three
weeks from the trade, only allowed Branzburg to observe their
actions on condition of anonymity.3' Following publication of the
story, Branzburg was promptly subpoenaed by a grand jury.32 He
appeared but refused to answer questions as to the identity of the two
hash makers.33 The case was appealed to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, which held that Branzburg could not refuse to testify about
events he had personally observed."
Two years later, Branzburg again published an article that
piqued the grand jury's interest, this time detailing illicit drug use in a
particular Kentucky city.3 5 This time, the reporter spent a couple of
weeks observing marijuana use by certain members of the Frankfort
community.36 Branzburg was again subpoenaed and again refused to
divulge the names of the drug users he witnessed while investigating
the story. His case once again reached the Kentucky court of appeal,
which as before did not find that forcing Branzburg to testify would
abridge "the freedom of the press within the meaning of that term as
used in the Constitution of the United States."38
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id.
29. Karl H. Schmid, Journalist's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of
United States Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441,
1451 (2002).
30. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
31. Id. at 668.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 669.
35. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
36. Id.
37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
38. Id. at 670.
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Meanwhile, in 1970, a news reporter working for a Massachusetts
television station gained entry into the New Bedford headquarters of
the radical African-American organization, the Black Panthers. 9 In
exchange for entry, the reporter, Pappas, agreed not to disclose what
he saw or heard inside the boarded-up store that served as the
Panther headquarters (though he was given permission to write about
and photograph any police raid that might occur).4° Pappas never
wrote a story about his observations in the store, as no police raid
ever took place. 41 Two months later, however, he was subpoenaed by
the Bristol County Grand Jury, where he was asked questions about
his experience at the Black Panther headquarters. Pappas refused to
answer inquiries regarding the time he spent with the Black Panthers,
claiming that the First Amendment protected him from being forced
to disclose confidential informants and related information. The case
was appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which
found that any negative impact on the "free dissemination of the
news by virtue of petitioner's being called to testify was.., only
'indirect, theoretical, and uncertain.'""
During the same time period, New York Times reporter emeritus
Earl Caldwell was following Black Panther activity on the West
Coast.45 Caldwell was promptly subpoenaed to appear before a grand
jury to testify about his interaction with the Panthers and to provide
notes and tape recordings of interviews given by Panther leaders that
detailed the party's activities.46 The New York Times moved to quash
the subpoena, arguing that forcing Caldwell to appear before the
grand jury would "suppress vital First Amendment freedoms... by
driving a wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and
the militants."47 The Times went on to say that there was no
compelling governmental interest in requiring Caldwell to testify.48
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found
Caldwell in contempt for refusing to testify, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, stating "requiring a reporter like Caldwell to testify would
39. Id. at 672.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672-73.
43. Id. at 673.
44. Id. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 302 (1971)).
45. Id. at 675.
46. Id.
47. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 676.
48. Id.
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deter his informants from communicating with him in the future and
would cause him to censor his writings in an effort to avoid being
subpoenaed."4 9 The court held that absent some showing by the
government that his testimony is essential to their investigation,
attendance at such a hearing was something Caldwell was privileged
to refuse because of the potential impact that such an appearance
may have on the dissemination of news to the public."
Branzburg and Pappas appealed their cases to the Supreme
Court, while the United States appealed its loss in the Ninth Circuit
to the High Court.5" All three reporters became linked in Branzburg
v. Hayes, a facially mundane 1972 case that would provide an uneasy
framework for reporters hoping to avoid any appearances on the
witness stand-whether to aid prosecutors, plaintiffs' attorneys, or
civil or criminal defense lawyers.
In the Branzburg decision, Justice White, writing for himself and
four other justices, declined to extend any First Amendment privilege
to news reporters, but he did acknowledge that the press enjoys
certain constitutional privileges when it comes to some forms of news
gathering and publication.12 "[T]hese cases involve no intrusions upon
speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press
may publish, and no express or implied command that the press
publish what it prefers to withhold."53 White then described various
circumstances where the press should not receive special treatment
due to First Amendment considerations, such as not receiving
permission to visit Cuba in order to facilitate the free flow of
information back from that country or not gaining access to crime or
disaster scenes where the general public is excluded.54 White then
referenced the decision in Garland v. Torre and noted that claims of
testimonial exemption by newsgatherers in civil suits had been
"almost uniformly rejected since then, although there are occasional
dicta that, in circumstances not presented here, a newsman might be
excused. 55
The opinion then emphasizes the important obligation that grand
juries have of determining whether probable cause exists to prosecute
an individual in criminal circumstances and to protect citizens against
49. Id. at 679.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 672, 675, 679.
52. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681, 690.
53. Id. at 681.
54. Id. at 684-85.
55. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685-86.
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unfounded criminal prosecutions:" "Fair and effective law
enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property
of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the
grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this
process. 57 However, Justice White gave prosecutors a stern warning
about the meaning of his opinion. 8 "Official harassment of the press
undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a
reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no
justification.... We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries
must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the
Fifth. '9
Justice Powell, who joined the majority opinion but also wrote a
concurrence, expanded upon the "limited nature of the Court's
holding" in three short paragraphs and gave reporters their first real
legal ammunition to fight subpoenas.6°
[I]f the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation,
or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate
need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a
motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be
entered. The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its
facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the
press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony
with respect to criminal conduct.
6
'
For more than 30 years after the Branzburg decision, a majority
of courts, both state and federal, have found a limited First
Amendment privilege based on Justice Powell's concurrence.62 Many
circuit courts also looked to Judge (and later Justice) Potter Stewart's
opinion in Garland v. Torre in balancing First Amendment interests
against compelling a reporter to testify.63 Considerations include the
type of controversy at issue; whether the information sought is critical
for the prosecution or defense of the case and whether the
information goes to the heart of the matter; the relevance and
materiality of the information; and whether the party seeking the
56. Id. at 686-87.
57. Id. at 690.
58. Id. at 707-08.
59. Id.
60. Tobin, supra note 5, at 53; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709.
61. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710.
62. Paul Smith & Lee Levine, Rethinking the Reporter's Privilege for the 21st Century,
MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Issue No. 2 2004, at 207.
63. Id. at 207-08.
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information from the reporter has exhausted possible alternative
64
sources.
Eight of the nine circuits have interpreted Branzburg as granting
qualified privilege to journalists against compelled disclosure (and
thus supporting the Powell concurrence balancing test), though not all
of them apply it in both criminal and civil settings.6' The Ninth Circuit
is one that reads the Branzburg decision broadly, as in Farr v.
Pitchess, where it found that the Branzburg Court "dealt precisely
with the First Amendment free press provision as it affected
testimony sought to be produced before a grand jury. However, the
opinion appears to teach broadly enough to be applied to other civil
or criminal judicial proceedings as well." 66 In the Farr case, a Los
Angeles newspaper reporter assigned to cover the Charles Manson
trial was given a copy of a confessed statement by one of Manson's
co-defendants divulging lurid details of their murder rampage,67 which
were reported in a front-page story for the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner.68 Seven months later, and one month after Manson was
convicted, the trial judge ordered Farr to show cause for why he
should not be compelled to reveal the name of the informant who
provided the statement (which was never used at trial).69 Judge
McNichols of the District of Idaho (sitting by designation in the Ninth
Circuit) stated the need to balance the "First Amendment protection
announced by Branzburg" with the "compelling judicial interest in
disclosure of the identity of those persons frustrating a duly entered
order of the court. Thus, also presented is the specific question raised
by this appeal-which of these conflicting rights is paramount?,
70
Judge McNichols discussed the "duty and obligation" of the trial
judge in a criminal case to protect defendants' rights to a fair trial-
one that is not hindered by adverse publicity.
7
'
That constitutional right cannot be so protected if the authority
of the court to enforce its orders is diluted. If the newsman's privilege
against disclosure of news sources is to serve as a bar to disclosure of
the names of those who disobey the court order, then the court is
64. Id. at 208.
65. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993).
66. 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 466.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Farr, 522 F.2d at 468.
71. Id. at 469.
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powerless to enforce this method of eliminating encroachment on the
due process right of the defendants.72
Judge McNichols determined that the district court struck the
appropriate balance between First Amendment protection of the
press and the necessity for the court to know the name of the person
who leaked the statement, and that in this instance, "the newsman's
privilege must yield to the more important and compelling need for
disclosure. ,
71
In the civil arena, in Shoen v. Shoen, a case between feuding
members of the U-Haul family, the Ninth Circuit held that an
investigative journalist working on a book about the clan (and
specifically looking into the murder of Eva Shoen, wife of one of the
U-Haul heirs apparent) was entitled to this qualified privilege. Since
the subpoena came early in the discovery process and there was little
effort by the plaintiffs to find other sources of the information sought,
the court held that this "threshold requirement" of seeking the
information from elsewhere was not satisfied.75
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, interprets Branzburg as
saying that any First Amendment qualified privilege that a reporter
may have only applies in civil cases where the reporter was not a
party, and not in criminal cases.76 In In re Bruce Selcraig, a reporter
was subpoenaed in a dispute between a fired Dallas schools
superintendent and the school district.77 The reporter refused to
disclose the source of a report he had obtained with less than
flattering information about the superintendent; he used the report
for a story that appeared in the Dallas Morning News. 7 ' Fifth Circuit
Judge Rubin determined that the plaintiff had not shown any
necessity for the reporter's testimony in pursuing his claim. 79 "In
short, he has not yet overcome Selcraig's qualified privilege not to
reveal confidential news sources. ' 8°
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Shoen, 5 F.3d. at 1298.
75. Id. at 1296, 1298.
76. Monica Dias, Branzburg Revisited? Landmark Ruling Limiting Reporter's
Privilege Turns 30, but Release of Jailed Writer Sparks Call for Review, 26 THE NEWS
MEDIA AND THE LAW, No. 1 2002, at 4, available at http:www.rcfp.org/news/mag/26-
1/cov-branzbur.html.
77. 705 F.2d 789, 794 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 792-94.
79. Id. at 797.
80. Id.
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However, Fifth Circuit Judge Higginbotham found that in a
criminal context, reporters do not enjoy a qualified privilege as
recognized in Selcraig and in other civil contexts. 8 Higginbotham
distinguished civil cases from the criminal case before him by stating
that the "Branzburg Court emphasized that the public's interest in
effective law enforcement outweighed the press's entitlement to a
First Amendment privilege against the disclosure of information.""
Only the Sixth Circuit interprets White's majority opinion in
Branzburg strictly, finding that the balancing test promoted in
Powell's concurrence should not be applied when deciding whether a
reporter must respond to questions from the grand jury." For
example, in Storer Communications v. Giovan, Sixth Circuit Judge
Alan Norris did not accept the reporter's arguments that he should
not be compelled to testify because he was among a class of reporters
protected by the "reporter's shield":'
Justice White ... declin[ed] to recognize the existence of a first
amendment reporter's "testimonial privilege that other citizens do
not enjoy" ... The conditional privilege rejected in Branzburg has,
in essence, been resurrected in this case by [the appellant] as his
claimed qualified privilege. In the course of spurning the
conditional privilege, the Supreme Court discussed at great length
the difficulties of administering such a privilege ... and the policy
reasons which argue against its recognition.
Many circuits in recent years have changed course and backed
away from Powell's balancing test in favor of focusing solely on
White's opinion and finding that the First Amendment does not
provide reporters with any protection with regard to sources.86 For
example, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit did not address First
Amendment considerations in a 2003 case involving reporters who
were ordered to turn over tapes of interviews to a criminal defendant
who believed the recordings would help his defense.f And most
recently, the First Circuit, while employing both "heightened
sensitivity" to First Amendment considerations and the Powell
balancing test to consider whether efforts to find the source of the
videotape that Rhode Island television news reporter Jim Taricani
81. United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998).
82. Id.
83. Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1292; see also Monica Dias, supra note 76.
84. Storer Communications v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 584.
86. Smith and Levine, supra note 62, at 208.
87. Id.; McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2003).
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had secured, still found that Taricani was in contempt of court and
had to turn over the tape or face detention.8'
Although the lower courts have interpreted Branzburg
inconsistently, many journalists would rather let the impact of the
decision remain less than fully shielding than force a conservative
Supreme Court to make a clarification that might prove further
detrimental to reporters.8 9 Many media lawyers, and certainly
newsgatherers, have been content with the state of things after
Branzburg, and fear that a Supreme Court decision today could
create bad law for journalists.' Accordingly, some legislators argue
the time is ripe for Congress to step in and provide the type of
protection that 31 states and the District of Columbia offer to
reporters. The key questions therefore are: (1) What form would this
legislation take? and (2) Should there be any exceptions to reporter's
privilege?
IV. The Current Debate Over Reporter's Privilege
The renewed dialogue over the reporter's privilege has been
sparked by recent incidents surrounding the leak of C.I.A. agent
Valerie Plame's identity. During the summer of 2003, conservative
syndicated columnist Robert Novak outted Plame in both print and
on television." Leaking the name of a covert operative is illegal-and
in this case, it appears that the leak came from Vice President Dick
Cheney's chief of staff Scooter Libby, who, on Oct. 28, 2005, was
charged with perjury, making a false statement to FBI agents, and
obstruction of justice. 92 There is wide speculation that the leak may
have originated even higher in the White House, but as of publication
time, only Libby had been indicted.9 The leak was most likely
88. Smith and Levine, supra note 62, at 208; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45
(lst Cir. 2004).
89. Dias, supra note 76.
90. John Wildermuth, Reporters Face Jail After Court Declines to Step in; 1st
Amendment Issue Remains Unsettled in Case Where CIA Agent's ID was Divulged,
S. F. CHRON., June 28, 2005, at A8.
91. Charles Lane, In Leak Case, Reporters Lack Shield for Sources, WASH. POST,
Nov. 29, 2004, at Al.
92. Zachary Coile, Vice Presidential Chief of Staff Lewis Libby Indicted on 5 Counts,
San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 29, 2005, at Al. It should be noted that Libby was not
charged with leaking the name of a covert operative, which is a violation of the federal
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. Rather, he is charged with attempting to
impede the grand jury's efforts to find out who revealed Plame's name as a covert agent.
Charles Lane, In Leak Case, Reporters Lack Shield for Sources, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
29, 2004, at Al.
93. Francis Harris, White House Aide Pleads Not Guilty to Perjury Charges, The
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retribution for criticism from Joseph C. Wilson IV, Plame's husband,
of the Bush administration's allegations that Iraq was purchasing
uranium, which is used to make nuclear weapons, from Niger. 4 In
addition to Novak, Judith Miller of the New York Times and Matthew
Cooper of Time magazine also were given Plame's name, but neither
published any story revealing the operative's identity.95 Both Miller
and Cooper were subpoenaed by special prosecutor Patrick
Fitzgerald, who was assigned to find the source of the leak.96 The two
reporters fought the subpoena, but lost in both the federal district
court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected any
notion that Justice Powell's concurrence in Branzburg provides some
sort of Constitutional protection for journalists in protecting their
sources. 97 "The Constitution protects all citizens, and there is no
reason to believe that Justice Powell intended to elevate the
journalistic class above the rest.... In any event, whatever Justice
Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority," Circuit Judge
Sentelle wrote for the three-judge panel in affirming the district
court's refusal to quash Fitzgerald's subpoenas against the reporters.9
The two reporters appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but were
denied certiorari. 99 In the end, Cooper brokered a deal with the
special prosecutor and testified, and Miller spent eighty-five days in
Daily Telegraph, Nov. 4, 2005, at International p. 18.
94. Lane, supra note 91.
95. Id.
96. Editorial, A Shield for News, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 9, 2004, at C30. Why
Robert Novak hasn't been publicly subpoenaed remains a mystery, especially considering
he did publish Plame's name in his column; many observers surmise that Novak may have
been subpoenaed, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, was
granted immunity from prosecution, and did indeed testify before the grand jury. See
Charles Duhigg, Robert Novak: How Does He Stay Out of Jail?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2004, at M6.
97. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2005); cert.
denied June 27, 2005.
98. Id. at 972; In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C.
2004). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the district court judge
ordered the reporters to either testify within one week or face jail time. Time, Inc.,
Cooper's employer, relented and handed over the reporter's notes to the special
prosecutor, and Cooper himself testified in front of the grand jury after the source, Karl
Rove, gave him permission to do so. Miller accepted a four-month jail sentence, which she
began serving in July of 2005. See Adam Liptak, Judge Gives Reporters One Week to
Testify or Face Jail Time, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A18; Liptak, Time Inc. to Yield
Files on Sources, Relenting to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at Al; Lorne Manly, Jail
Where Reporter Is Held: Maximum, Modern Security, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2005, at A18;
Liptak, For Time Reporter, Decision to Testify Came After Frenzied Last-Minute Calls,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A12.
99. Miller v. U.S., 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
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jail before it was revealed that Libby had given her permission to
break their confidentiality agreement.'0
The debate over the Plame incident has highlighted how deeply
emotions run when it comes to the First Amendment. Arthur
Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, vowed to fight Miller's
subpoena; editorial columns label the jailing of reporters for refusing
to divulge sources as "medieval"; and journalism groups cry out for a
congressional solution to the problem. ' ' However, even some media
industry insiders are calling for reporters to take the stand when
called upon, just as non-reporters are required to do."° One member
of the Chicago Tribune editorial board argued that even if there were
a shield law protecting journalists from divulging their sources, Miller
and Cooper probably would and should still be compelled to testify."13
"The prosecutor has already met a stringent test designed to prevent
the abuse of journalists.... If Miller and Cooper know the source of
this illegal leak and refuse to tell, they are protecting a criminal who
betrayed his country.
' '104
These statements exemplify the fact that most arguments against
any journalist's privilege are made in the context of criminal law, not
national security.10'5 Many of these arguments mirror the reasoning
found in Garland v. Torre and Branzburg v. Hayes, primarily that the
obligation to ensure the fair administration of justice takes
precedence over any right a journalist has to protect a source.106
Additionally, allowing a journalist to protect confidential sources and
information may interfere with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to compulsory process for summoning witnesses and others who will
100. Don Van Natta, Jr., Adam Liptak and Clifford J. Levy, The Miller Case: A
Notebook, A Cause, a Jail Cell, and a Deal, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at Al.
Following Miller's release, many questioned her close relationship with the Bush
administration, particularly Libby, given that she continued to protect her source after he
had reportedly given her permission to testify long before she went to prison. Jon Carroll,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 5, 2005, at El0.
101. Nicholas Kristof, Our Not-So-Free Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at A25, and
Peter Scheer, Subpoenas for Reporters' Confidential Sources, California First Amendment
Coalition Flash, available at
http://www.craf.org/Attachments/Flash%20Text%2010.28.04.htm (last visited Dec. 15,
2004).
102. Steve Chapman, Why the Press is Wrong About the Valerie Plame Case, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Oct. 28, 2004, at C21.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Karl H. Schmid, supra note 29, at 1458.
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help with his or her defense."°7 Also frequently cited is the concern
that giving journalists the power to decide whether relevant testimony
will be excluded from trial undermines courts' authority to manage
criminal trials and thus also diminishes the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights.1 8
Those who support the existence of a reporter's privilege argue
that without constitutionally based protection the public would be
deprived of important information related not only to the operation
of government, but also to private-sector antitrust and other business-
related issues and military affairs.'9 In the first category-which
includes coverage revealing government corruption, deception or
misinformation about public policy-stories about topics such as
Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and the Iran-Contra arms-for-
hostages deal were all supplied by anonymous sources. " In the
private sector, an Orange County Register reporter who produced a
Pulitzer Prize-winning series on fraud related to fertility clinics in
1995 obtained clinical records for her story from an anonymous
source. " In the military realm, some of the most disturbing and
compelling images to come out of the ongoing war in Iraq have been
photographs leaked to the media by anonymous sources, such as
those showing American soldiers and Iraqi prisoners at the Abu
Ghraib prison. 112
Clearly, there is a need for reporters to offer their sources
confidentiality if the press is going to operate in the vigorous manner
that the Framers envisioned. "3 The primary issue is how far any
federal shield law should stretch: should it be an absolute protection
against being compelled to reveal anonymous sources, or a qualified
privilege with a balancing test similar to what many courts read from
Branzburg? An examination of state shield laws can prove helpful in
clarifying this issue.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1458-59.
109. Steven D. Zansberg, The Empirical Case: Proving the Need for the Privilege, 2
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111. Id. at 164 n.50.
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113. Tobin, supra note 5, at 32.
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V. State Shield Laws: A Brief Survey
No two state shield laws are exactly alike."4 The 32 shield laws on
the books fall roughly into three categories of protection: (1) those
that provide absolute protection for journalists asked to disclose their
sources and notes; (2) those that recognize a strong degree of
protection of sources but weaker protection for unpublished
information; and (3) those that employ a qualified privilege test
similar to that found in some post-Branzburg circuits-which applies
to both notes and sources and requires the government to show that
the information sought is relevant and essential to the underlying
proceedings and is unavailable from other sources.' Additionally,
some state shield laws protect only unnamed sources of information,
while others protect the information itself, whether it was given by a
confidential source or not.
California's shield law, written into both the state constitution
and evidence code, provides absolute protection to reporters in
shielding their sources and unpublished notes." 6 However, even
though the wording of the statute creates absolute immunity from
contempt for a reporter who refuses to testify about an undisclosed
source or unpublished information, the California Supreme Court has
found that the shield law's protection may be overcome in criminal
settings in order to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial."7 Four
balancing factors have been outlined that California courts need to
consider when deciding whether a reporter should be compelled to
testify: (1) whether the unpublished information is confidential or
sensitive; (2) the interests sought to be protected by the shield law
(e.g., whether any of the parties who disclosed information to the
reporter would be reluctant in the future to speak to the reporter); (3)
the importance of the information to the criminal defendant; and (4)
the availability of information from some alternative source."8
In Delaney v. Superior Court in 1990, both the criminal
defendant and the prosecutor sought the testimony of two Los
Angeles Times journalists who, while following a police task force for
a story, witnessed a search that police alleged was performed with the
114. Robert D. Lystad & Malena F. Barzilai, Reporter's Privilege: Legislative and
Regulatory Developments, MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Issue No. 2 (2004) at
95.
115. Id. at 87-94.
116. CAL. CONST. art. I §2(b): Cal. Evid. Code §1070.
117. Lystad & Barzilai, supra note 114, at 105; Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d
785, 805 (1990).
118. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 815.
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suspect's consent (and turned up brass knuckles, possession of which
is a misdemeanor in California). 9 The supreme court decided that
since both the prosecution and the defense wanted the reporters'
testimony, the journalists could not invoke the state shield law to
keep them off of the stand:12°
Delaney's personal liberty is at stake. The reporters are not being
asked to breach a confidence or to disclose sensitive information
that would in any way even remotely restrict their newsgathering
ability. All that is being required of them is to accept the civic
responsibility imposed on all persons who witness alleged criminal
conduct."'
Most states recognize a qualified, not absolute, privilege for
reporters, with a balancing test that is similar to that found in the
Branzburg concurrence. 22 Eight jurisdictions offer a mixture of
absolute and qualified privilege. In Maryland, for example, the shield
law gives absolute protection over sources, but only qualified
protection to unpublished material held by the reporter123 A party
seeking to compel a reporter to testify as to unpublished observations
and notes must establish the relevance of the notes to the proceeding,
that there are no alternative means of obtaining the information, and
that there is a compelling interest in the information. 12 4 Colorado's
shield law requires the party seeking the information to show that (1)
the information is directly relevant to a substantial issue involved in
the proceeding; (2) the information cannot be obtained by any other
reasonable means; and (3) a strong interest of the party seeking to
subpoena the reporter outweighs the First Amendment interests of
the newsperson in not responding to the subpoena and the general
public in receiving news information.
1 25
VI. The Federal Solution
Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) introduced the Free Flow of
Information Act of 2005 in July, which provides absolute protection
for newspersons from testifying or turning over documents unless
there is no other source for the information, and the information is
essential in revealing whether a crime has occurred or, alternatively,
119. Id. at 793.
120. Id. at 816.
121. Id.
122. Lystad & Barzilai, supra note 114, at 122.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 124.
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for national security purposes when there is imminent and actual
harm.1 16 Sen. Christopher Dodd, a co-sponsor of Lugar's bill, had
introduced a similar but broader bill in early 2005. Under the
proposed legislation, the party seeking the information must establish
"by clear and convincing evidence" that (1) the news or information
is critical and necessary to the resolution of a significant legal issue
before any entity of the judicial, legislative, or executive branch of the
federal government that has the power to issue a subpoena; (2) the
news or information could not be obtained by any alternative means;
and (3) there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure.'2 7
Lugar's bill has received support both in Congress and among
news organizations and interest groups.2 ' However, some media
advocates are concerned that the law reaches too far. Scott
Armstrong, executive director of the Information Trust, said in a
radio interview that the national security exception could prevent
government officials from speaking in the "very area in which you
would want people to have their sources protected so that they can
have a candid conversation. 1 29 Armstrong argued that officials may
be reluctant to candidly speak with reporters for fear that they are
violating the law.30 He did acknowledge that the bill includes an
"actual and imminent danger" provision; however, this may not have
protected Judith Miller from being compelled to testify."'
Most reporters, of course, would prefer absolute immunity in all
situations: journalists generally believe reporters should never be
called to testify.32 Confidentiality allows reporters who cover
government-from local city councils to the White House-to access
information from whistleblowers who see the opportunity to expose
wrongdoing without losing their jobs over their revelations. It also
gives reporters the ability to break into social groups that otherwise
are hostile to outsiders (e.g., mafia, illegal immigrants, drug
126. Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005).
127. Free Speech Protection Act, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005).
128. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, Justice Department Reiterates
Opposition to Federal Shield Law, available at http://rcfp.org/news/2OO5/lO19-con-
justic.html (Oct. 19, 2005).
129. Democracy Now!: Almost 1,000 Dead After U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Democratic
Senators Call in Secret Session for Investigation of Pre-War Intelligence (KPFA radio
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manufacturers, etc.). Just because reporters often observe these
groups while the subjects are engaged in illegal activities does not
mean that the police should immediately gain access to any
unpublished information. These sources want their stories shared
with the outside world, often perhaps in the hope that the community
will gain insight into the deeper social issues that drive individuals to
commit crimes, illegally cross the border for work, or become
addicted to drugs. For example, the San Francisco Chronicle regularly
reports on the city's homelessness problem and often interviews drug
addicts who allow the newspaper to record them as they shoot up
heroin or smoke methamphetamine. 33 Compelling a reporter to
testify against a source who allows such an invasion of privacy would
push those on the fringe of society even further underground and
would deprive the public of information necessary to make policy
choices.
Both Lugar and Dodd's bills require a balancing of the public
interest against the interests of the media in protecting their sources.
Dodd's three-part test for establishing when reporters' notes should
be released appears to be a strict one: it requires that other possible
sources for the information be exhausted before compelling the
reporter to testify, as well as deciding whether there exists an
"overriding" public interest in disclosure.' To strengthen this bill, a
balancing element is needed for these "notes" situations. Such a
balancing test would weigh the needs of a free press against the need
for evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.'35 Lugar's bill, on the
other hand, protects both the news person and his or her notes, and
specifies what types of public interest should be considered when
compulsion to testify is a possibility."' This narrowing of what
constitutes situations where the reporter should be compelled to
testify is desirable; still, the media should question Congress as to
what types of information that may be passed from sources to
reporter might fall within the "imminent threat" category, especially
given the fact that many reporters keep sensitive information to
themselves (as did Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper) for fear they
may harm national security.
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VII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Miller and Cooper's
case, which may have been the best result at this juncture considering
that the conservative Court could have produced a decision far worse
than the existing maze of law that Branzburg created for reporters.
3 7
The Court indeed might return to Justice White's majority opinion to
affirm that no privilege for news reporters can be read into the First
Amendment. Justice White made it clear that he was unwilling to
interpret the First Amendment as granting "newsmen a testimonial
privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. ... [There is] no basis for
holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring
effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the
consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering.
138
Journalists historically have objected to congressional action in
this arena because they believe that the First Amendment provides all
the protection they need. 139 However, Senator Lugar and Senator
Dodd's proposals illustrate that the issue will likely be decided by
legislation, and reporters and editors would be wise to back his bill.
With seventy-two percent of the public in agreement that journalists
should be allowed to keep news sources confidential, 40 reporters,
editors, publishers and producers should pressure their senators and
congressmen to push for passage of this critical law.
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